The wars between Carthage and Rome in antiquity resulted in death and destruction in a scale so vast that it is comparable to that of WWI and WW II. Called “Punic Wars” by the Romans, they were surely known as “Roman Wars” by the Carthaginians, whose records have been lost or obliterated. The conflict lasted over a century, from 264 to 146 BCE, longer than any other war in recorded history. The protagonists were a North African maritime trading city-state and an emerging imperialistic power in the Italian peninsula. The struggle between them devastated the Mediterranean world and resulted in well over a million deaths. But who deserves the blame for these conflagrations—who started them, and why? In this article we will examine the matter of the culpability or Kriegsschuldfrage in the “Punic” (or “Roman”) wars. This question has generated quite a bit of literature and debate, as reflected by the entries in the bibliography at the end of this paper.
The Roman Republic, it is often argued, was well known for its explicit emphasis on laws and legality. Roman historians typically present the city on the Tiber as following the rule of law. They would have us believe that Rome was always in the right and fought wars only for a just cause, to ward off aggression by others or to defend allies they had agreed to protect. Let us examine these claims in the light of the facts of the historical record. When we do so, we will see that the evidence does not support them and that all three so-called Punic Wars were actually initiated by Rome under one pretext or another, none being the result of benevolent intervention.
Let us start by looking at the first conflict (264-241). At the time, Sicily was divided between the eastern part, under the control of Syracuse, and the western part, under the influence of Carthage. In 288 BCE, a group of thugs known as the Mamertines, who were renegade Campanian mercenaries, occupied the city of Messana (today’s Messina) in Sicily, killing all the adult males and forcing the women to become their “wives.” Defeated in battle by the forces of King Hiero II of Syracuse, the Mamertines secretly called on the Carthaginians and on the Romans for help. The Carthaginians, interested in curtailing Syracusan control, interceded first, achieving a cessation of hostilities with Hiero and placing a detachment of troops in Messana, the latter to the displeasure of the Mamertines. The Roman Senate, in the meantime, although Rome had no presence or investment in Sicily, voted to send an invasion force to exploit the opportunity to displace the Carthaginians and commence Roman expansion into Sicily. The Roman attack started the first Punic War, which initially saw Carthaginians and Syracusans become allies to try to repel the invaders. After being defeated by the Romans, King Hiero, in self-preservation mode, switched sides, and the war became one between Rome and Carthage.
That the Roman invasion was not motivated by altruistic goals is clear from the fact that at the same time that Messana was initially occupied by the Mamertines, a similar gang of cutthroat renegade soldiers had taken over Rhegium, right across the narrow strait separating Italy from Sicily. The thugs on the Italian side were severely punished by the Romans (most were summarily executed). Consequently, any claim by the Romans that they were interested in the protection of a similar gang in Messana is laughable. Clearly, expansionistic greed was behind the initiation of hostilities that would last 23 years and cost hundreds of thousands of lives.
As for the second Punic War, pro-Roman historians, such as Polybius and Livy, have tried to blame the initiation of the hostilities on the actions of the great Carthaginian general, Hannibal Barca, who some believe was motivated by a need to avenge the wrongs committed against Carthage as well as by his undying hatred of Rome. According to the classical sources (Polybius and Livy), when Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar Barca, was preparing his expedition to Iberia, nine year old Hannibal asked to be allowed to accompany him. Hamilcar, the story goes, asked his son to put his hand on the sacrificial animal offered on the altar to Baal, and made him swear that he would never be a friend of Rome (Polybius). Livy’s version changes this to “forever being an enemy of Rome.” But where does the story of Hannibal’s childhood oath come from? Polybius (3.11) reports that Hannibal, then 54, in exile at the court of Antiochus III of Syria, needed to convince the king of his trustworthiness as an enemy of Rome, and related the story of his youthful oath to dispel any doubts. It is not clear how the anecdote reached Polybius, or that it is at all authentic. Livy’s version was clearly based on the Polybian account, and when others followed Livy (e.g., Silius Italicus, Punica, Book 1, 100-121), the image of the hate-filled bogeyman from Carthage was formed.
Not only is the authenticity of the story questionable, but the meaning of the Polybian version, “not to be a friend of Rome,” must be examined within the context of the significance of Roman expressions of the time. An “amicus” of Rome does not have the same meaning as the word “friend” in modern usage, for amicus signified also a “client,” and therefore a subject, of Rome. A city or state that was a friend (amicus) of Rome was one that not only was not bellicose, but was actually subservient to Rome. If we were to accept for a moment that the anecdote is not fictitious, the meaning of Hannibal’s swearing that he would never be a “friend” of Rome would most likely be that he promised not to accept being subjugated by Rome, or submitting to Roman hegemony—a far cry from “eternal hatred,” indeed.
The prelude to the second “Punic” war (218-201) was the Roman annexation of Sardinia, a Carthaginian territory, at a time when Carthage was unable to respond due to the devastation caused by the first war and by the “truceless war” it was forced to wage against its own mutinous mercenaries (241-237). Hamilcar Barca had been the commander of the Carthaginian land forces in Sicily at the time of the disastrous naval defeat at the Aegates Islands in 241 BCE, which compelled Carthage to capitulate. Although Hamilcar himself remained unvanquished, he was forced to accept the defeat of Carthage and was put in charge of repatriating the contingents of mercenaries that composed his army. He wisely sent them home gradually, so that they could be paid and dismissed one group at a time. The Carthaginian magistrates, though, misjudged the situation, waited until all the men were back, and then attempted to negotiate reduced pay. This led to violent mutiny, and in the following conflict, characterized by atrocities on both sides, the very survival of the city was at stake. While Hamilcar was able to crush the rebellion, Carthage was exhausted and powerless to resist the theft of Sardinia and later Corsica by the Romans, who added insult to injury by demanding an exorbitant additional war indemnity under the threat of a new declaration of war.
Hamilcar led an expeditionary force to Spain, to secure the resources that Carthage would need to pay the indemnity owed to Rome. He was successful in his endeavors, expanding Carthaginian control in Iberia until his death in an ambush in 228, where he sacrificed himself to save the lives of his sons. His successor was his son-in-law, Hasdrubal the Handsome, who continued Carthaginian expansion, mostly by diplomatic means, until he was assassinated in 221. It was during his rule that the Romans, concerned with the success of the Carthaginians, sent a delegation to establish the Ebro Treaty (signed in 226 or 225). By it, the Carthaginians agreed to accept the boundary of the river Iber (Ebro), which they were not to cross in arms. Interestingly enough, the Roman historians do not inform us about Rome’s responsibilities under the treaty, although obviously there must have been some quid pro quo: Rome was not to interfere south of the Ebro.
The Romans implicitly violated the Ebro treaty by forming an alliance with the city of Saguntum, south of the Ebro and thus within Carthaginian territory. There is no evidence that such alliance existed prior to the signing of the treaty. Not only that, but Rome encouraged the Saguntines to massacre Carthaginian partisans in their city and to aggress against the Turboleti, a tribe under Carthaginian protection. Hannibal, who had been voted by acclamation the new commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian forces in Spain upon the death of his brother-in-law, reacted by marching against Saguntum and taking it by storm, after an eight-month-long siege. During those eight months the Saguntines sent repeated requests for assistance to Rome, to no avail—no help materialized. The Romans waited until Saguntum had fallen and then sent a delegation to Carthage to demand that Hannibal be turned over to them for punishment. Following the refusal of the Carthaginian assembly, Rome declared war on Carthage.
The Romans were confident of victory. Since they now controlled the Mediterranean (which they called Mare Nostrum, “Our Sea”), they were not concerned with an attack on Italy from the sea, and since the supposedly impassable natural barrier of the Alps in the north protected them from an invasion by land, they expected to wage the new war in Spain and in North Africa, the land of their enemies. Consequently, they sent an army to the south, under consul Sempronius Longus, to cross over to Africa from Sicily, and another west, under consul Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder), to invade Spain. Of course, they were not counting on the military genius of Hannibal and his daring expedition crossing the Alps, forcing them to change their plans. It is clear, though, that the blame for the provocation and initiation of the second Punic War rests squarely on the shoulders of Rome.
The third Punic War (149-146) was waged against a Carthage that no longer posed any threat to Rome, 34 years after the death of Hannibal. It was motivated by the hatred exemplified in the “delenda est Carthago” (“Carthage must be destroyed!”) that ended every talk of the bitter Roman senator and moralist, Cato the Elder, as well as by jealousy of the African city’s economic recovery and prosperity, following its defeat in the second war. Hannibal’s work as suffete or magistrate after the war had served to eliminate corruption in government and had allowed Carthage to offer to pay off the crippling indemnity imposed by Rome much faster than expected.
Another condition imposed on Carthage at the end of the second Punic War proved fatal—a prohibition to wage war, even in self-defense, without permission from Rome. The Romans encouraged the aggression of the Numidian king, Masinissa, who kept encroaching on Carthaginian territory. Appeals from Carthage for Rome to intervene were ignored. When finally the Carthaginians attempted to defend themselves, Rome used this as excuse to declare war. The Carthaginians did not want war, and offered capitulation plus the payment of a further indemnity. The Romans demanded that in addition they also provide hostages and surrender all weapons in the city. Once the Carthaginians had complied, the Romans revealed their true intentions. They demanded that the entire population leave the city, moving south into hostile territory where their survival would be ephemeral, and declared that Carthage would be destroyed. This, the Carthaginians refused to accept. They heroically defended their city against a Roman siege for three long years. When the Romans finally breached the city’s defenses, what followed was an orgy of killing on a monstrous scale, what we today would call ethnic cleansing, or simply genocide. The great city was razed and burned to the ground, the inhabitants—men, women, and children—were slaughtered (over 700,000), and the survivors (50,000) were sold into slavery. The libraries and all the records of the defeated were destroyed in the process, leaving only pro-Roman accounts to tell the story.
The causes of war, of any war, tend to be complex, and include social, cultural, economic, and psychological factors. The Punic Wars were no exception. Consequently, the preceding analysis cannot claim to be comprehensive or exhaustive, but in view of the available evidence there can be little doubt that the instigators of the wars between Rome and Carthage were definitely the Romans, and that their primary motivations were greed, hatred, and a thirst for conquest—in one word, imperialism. The ultimate defeat of Carthage opened the gates for the legions of Rome to march and trample on whatever freedom remained in the Mediterranean world—the predatory Roman Empire was in the process of being born.
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© 2012 by Yozan Mosig
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