“Where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his country with troops for its defence as that 10,000 men descending from the clouds, might not, in many places, do an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought together to repel them?”. Benjamin Franklin, 1784.
Following the success of the D Day landings in June 1944, the Allies expected to make a steady advance eastward, but found themselves bogged down for many weeks in the bitter Battle for Normandy.
When they finally broke out and decisively defeated the German forces in the Falaise pocket, they believed that they would thereafter encounter only light resistance on their march to the Rhine. They had swept through France and Belgium and were poised to enter the Netherlands. The Germans however, while retreating, remained an obstinate enemy and the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, faced an advance on a very wide front against well prepared positions. He had four armies at his disposal. In the north were General Mongomery’s 21st Army Group, General Bradley’s 12th Army Group and 6th Army Group under General Devers. In the south was 3rd Army Group under the flamboyant General George Patton.
In mid August, Montgomery proposed a plan for 21st Army Group to make a single thrust through northern France and the Low Countries to cross the branches of the Lower Rhine, bypassing the German Siegfried Line and attacking Germany’s industrial heartland of the Ruhr. He argued that German resistance had been considerably weakened on his front and that his plan would have the benefit of eliminating the V1 rocket sites that had been attacking southern England and also liberate the ports of northern France to aid the Allied supply situation. Paratroops would be dropped close to bridges across the river and prevent them from being destroyed by the Germans until allied ground troops could advance to support them.
If successful, the plan would open the route to Berlin and hopefully force the end of the war in Europe by Christmas 1944.
Montgomery initially proposed the plan to be a British and Polish airborne operation codenamed “Comet”, but it was soon expanded to involve most of the First Allied Airborne Army supported by a set piece ground attack through the Netherlands. The plan called for the US 101st Airborne Division to capture key bridges around Eindhoven, the 82nd Airborne Division to secure the crossings around Nijmegen, while the British 1st Airborne Division with the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade attached were tasked with capturing the three furthest bridges across the Rhine at Arnhem. The British 2nd Army, led by XXX Corps, would then advance up this airborne corridor, securing the airborne troops positions and cross the Rhine in two days. The codename for the venture was Operation Market Garden and was to become the largest strategic airborne assault in the history of warfare.
Major General Roy Urqhart, a officer with no experience in airborne operations, was appointed commander of the British airborne division which consisted of three infantry brigades, (two parachute and one glider borne) some artillery, Royal Engineers, the Polish paratroops and 1,200 men of the Glider Pilot Regiment.
Urguhart was ordered to secure the road, rail and pontoon bridges over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem and hold them for two to three days until relieved by XXX Corps, but his plans were hampered from the start by the shortage of aircraft. The US 1X Troop Carrier Command, with two other major drops taking place at the same time, were unable to take Urquhart’s force to the area in one lift, meaning that it would take three days to deliver the entire Division. Furthermore, the lack of suitable landing sites for the gliders meant that Urquhart was forced to choose landing zones (LZ) and drop zones (DZ) up to eight miles from Arnhem. This would not only lose him the element of surprise, but also expose his forces to counter attack while they waited for the remainder of the group to arrive. He realised that if he was to secure the bridges, town and drop zones for subsequent supply drops, he would need to defend a perimeter of some 18 miles.
He decided to land his 1st Parachute Brigade and 1st Air Landing Brigade on the first day. The Air Landing units would secure the drop zones for the following day’s drop, while the Paras would take three separate routes into Arnhem to secure the bridges. Lieutenant Colonel John Frost commanded the 2nd Battalion and would follow the riverside route into the centre of Arnhem, (codenamed the Lion Route) and secure the main road and railway bridges as well as the pontoon bridge between the two, while the 3rd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Fitch, would head through Oosterbeek to Arnhem, (Tiger Route). Lieutenant Colonel Dobie’s 3rd Battalion would follow Leopard Route north of the railway and occupy the high ground to the north and west of the town. The whole advance would be led by a squadron of reconnaissance jeeps from 1st Airborne Reconnaissance under the command of Major Gough who would attempt a fast surprise attack to take the road bridge.
A further Parachute Brigade (4th) would be dropped on the second day, together with artillery units and the remaining elements of the Air Landing Brigade to reinforce the positions north and west of Arnhem. The Polish Brigade were to be dropped on day three to reinforce the perimeter and link up with their own artillery coming in by glider. They would all then dig in, hold the perimeter and await the arrival of XXX Corps who would advance beyond the bridgehead and, together with an Infantry Division that was to be flown into the nearby Deelen airfield, smash their way forward to the Ruhr. The whole operation was to be re-supplied daily by 38 and 46 Group RAF.
Poor intelligence led the British to believe that they would encounter only light resistance from German reserve forces who were described as disorderly and dispirited and the assault troops were confident of success. Information was then received from Dutch resistance fighters that German armour was in the Arnhem area. Aerial reconnaissance was ordered by the Division’s Intelligence Officer which confirmed the presence of tanks, but the information was dismissed by senior staff and the Chief Medical Officer was ordered to have the Intelligence Officer sent on sick leave.
Crucially, Supreme Headquarters Allied European Forces (SHAEF) was also aware that two Panzer Divisions had arrived in the Arnhem area, but with the operation looming, chose to ignore the threat and did not inform Urquhart. It is difficult to justify the reasons for senior offices at Divisional Headquarters and at SHAEF to withhold this vital information to the fighting men, but it is known that Montgomery’s rather arrogant style did not suit some senior officers and a rivalry existed between him and General Patton as to who would be first into Berlin, resulting in much vying for position at Headquarters. Is it possible that some wanted to see Montgomery’s plan fail and that such small mindedness could result in the assault going ahead without the troops involved being made aware of the armour?
After the liberation of Antwerp, resulting in heavy German losses, the allies paused to regroup on the Dutch border, giving the Germans time to re-organise their defences in the Netherlands. Feldmarschall Walter Model, commander of Army Group B, had moved his headquarters to Arnhem and had re-established defences there, bringing together his scattered units. To the west of Arnhem was Kampfgruppe Von Tettau, with 7 infantry battalions, plus 16th SS Training Division, commanded by SS Sturmbannführer Sep Krafft.
Unbeknown to the British, the German 11 SS Panzer Corps had also moved into the area to refit and regroup after the heavy fighting in France. This Panzer unit, commanded by highly regarded Waffen SS Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittich, contained the remains of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, the 9th Panzergrenadier Brigade, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion and two batteries of self propelled guns in addition to their tanks. There were also units of Dutch SS, recruited by the Germans from fascist sympathisers. These units added some 7,000 experienced fighting men to the German defence.
September 17th was Day One of the operation and began with intense bombing and strafing attacks by the British 2nd Tactical Air Force and the American 8th and 9th Air Forces, targeting the flak guns, barracks and garrisons in the area. It is difficult to imagine the huge reach of the operation, but some idea of scale can be gleaned from the number of aircraft involved. Over 3,500 planes set off from England that day to attack the three target areas, with over 1,000 fighter escorts. Some 1,500 planes and 500 gliders were involved in the Arnhem assault giving the attackers overwhelming air superiority. A German survivor of the battle later commented ruefully on the sight, “If you saw a silver plane, it was American, if you saw a black plane it was British, if you saw no plane, it was the Luftwaffe”.
The first allied troops to land were the one hundred and eighty six pathfinders of the 21st Independent Parachute Company who immediately prepared and marked out the landing zones for the following Para and glider troops. The landings were largely unopposed and by 2.30 in the afternoon the glider troops had moved into defensive positions around the landing area, while the Paras moved east towards the bridges. Some glider losses, due to German flak, resulted in most of the reconnaissance jeeps being destroyed and were not available for the planned rush to the bridges.
The Germans were unprepared for the landings and were thrown into confusion. Feldmarschall Model, mistakenly believing that the paratroops had been sent to capture him, fled his headquarters and moved to the safety of armoured troops stationed at Doetinchem east of Arnhem.
The glider troops protecting the perimeter cleared the nearby town of Wolfheze and established a screen around the north east edge of the landing zone. The Germans had abandoned twenty one 105mm guns in the town and Royal Engineers destroyed the breeches with grenades. The Germans were not slow to react to the assault and as the size of the attack became clear, gathered their forces and hardened their defences with astonishing speed. One unit in particular reacted very sharply to the attack; this was SS Panzergrenadier Batallion 16, led by Sturmbannführer Krafft, who was based in woods east of the landing area. Krafft realised immediately that the enemy objective was Arnhem Bridge and quickly gathering every man he could find, he managed to establish a blocking line covering the more obvious routes from the landing areas to Arnhem. Although only 435 men strong, he hoped to convince the British that his force was much larger and in doing so, delay the British until proper defences could be established.
Bittich sent 9th SS Panzer Division into Arnhem, with orders to contain the 1st Airborne and then destroy it. His other tank unit was sent to Nijmegen Bridge to establish a bridgehead south of the river and deny its use to the enemy. In a report sent to Berlin, Bittich noted, “We shall soon be able to discount the threat of the British north of the Neder Rijn. We must remember that British soldiers do not act on their own initiative when they are fighting in a town and when it consequently becomes difficult for officers to exercise control. They are amazing in defence, but we need not be afraid of their capabilities in attack”.
Meanwhile, the American 101st Airborne had landed and captured the bridges at Veghel and Son. By nightfall they had linked up with the advancing British infantry and moved forward to Eindhoven.
The American 82nd Airborne had also landed at Grave and Nijmegen, but fog delayed some of the glider and tug flights and weakened the attack. The Americans were forced to attempt a crossing of the River Waal under heavy enemy fire taking heavy casualties. A US Company Commander, Moffat Burriss, recalls, “The bullets hitting the water looked like hailstones. When we reached about the half way point, then the mortar and artillery fire started falling and when a boat was hit by a mortar or artillery shell, it just disintegrated and everybody was lost”. The bridge at Waal was finally taken, followed by vicious street fighting on the 20th September by a combined British/American attack. With this bridge captured, the XXX Corps could now race towards Arnhem to relieve Urquhart’s troops.
Back at the landing ground the British paratroops advanced towards the town, but came under heavy fire from the now alert German defenders. The 3rd Battalion moved towards Arnhem through the nearby town of Oosterbeek. Only the 2nd Battalion, now down to some 500 men, led by Lieutenant Colonel Frost, and being the most southerly of the British units, managed to make progress as the Germans had covered his route less well than the other approaches to the town, but was himself slowed down by cheering Dutch civilians and did not get into the town until late in the day.
Frost secured the northern end of the bridge and the surrounding buildings including the local Van Limburg Stirum school, but was badly exposed to German fire from the south as British forces had been unable to secure the other end. German engineers then blew the railway bridge and damaged the centre span of the pontoon, leaving only the road bridge intact. All British forces were now heavily engaged in combat with the SS and were taking heavy casualties as the Germans were now being reinforced with Tiger tanks. A German survivor recalls, “The fighting was an indescribable fanaticism and the fight raged through the ceilings and staircases, hand grenades flew in every direction. Each house had to be taken in this way. The British offered resistance to their last breath”.
As the fighting progressed, more and more troops became available to the Germans as Hitler himself, stunned by the attack, ordered all available forces to aid the defenders.
The commander of the 9th SS Armoured Artillery Regiment, Obersturmführer Ludwig Spindler, was ordered to advance west and block and establish a blocking line to prevent the British forces entering the Arnhem area. There was much confusion on both sides as the fighting increased in intensity. The Commander of the Arnhem garrison, Major General Kussin was killed by Paras of the 3rd Battalion, leading to a breakdown in command and responsibilities, while the British struggled to maintain communication with each other as their radio sets failed to work properly in the heavily wooded terrain.
In Arnhem, the Paras who were lightly armed and lacked the heavy weapons required to hold the tanks off, struggled on. Major Tony Hibbert, who fought at Arnhem, recalls, “We really had nothing we could do to them and they drove up and down the street, firing high explosives into the sides of the buildings to create gaps and then fired smoke shells through them. The phosphorus from the shells burned us out. By about eight o clock on Wednesday evening, the fire got out of control and of course, by this time, we had about 300 wounded in the cellar”.
That afternoon the German, led by two tanks, managed to drive some of the defenders from the houses and school near the bridge, but were themselves driven back when one tank was destroyed by a 6 pounder and the other by a Piat, (Projectile, Infantry, Anti Tank). All day rumours had been circulating that the 1st and 3rd Battalions would arrive with reinforcements, giving much heart to the defenders. The Germans too were worried and that evening launched another infantry attack over the bridge. They were met with a hail of fire, followed by an all or nothing bayonet charge from the Paras and they retreated.
At the end of the first day, the Para’s 3rd Battalion was stalled by Krafft’s defences while the 1st Battalion went further north, but were stopped by Spindler’s group. At dusk, the last of 2nd Battalion, some Royal Engineers, plus two jeeps and four 6 pounder anti tank guns, moved into Arnhem to join Frost, whose forces now amounted to just over 700. The Germans continued to pour troops into the area, including specialist street fighting and machine gun Battalions while the British troops outside the town tried desperately to break the German lines.
The next morning two further attempts were made by the British to reach Arnhem, but the German line was now too strong to break through. At the road bridge, the 9th SS had now surrounded Frost’s Battalion and cut them off from the rest of the Division. At 9 am, units of the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion attempted to storm the bridge, but were driven off with 70 killed, plus its commander Hauptsturmführer Grabner, and 12 armoured cars and half tracks destroyed.
German forces were moving against the landing grounds and troops of the Kings Own Scottish Borderers came into contact with advance units of the Dutch SS Wach Battalion threatening to hamper the arrival of the second airlift. The problems with their radio sets made it impossible for the landed troops to warn the incoming gliders and paratroops who came under heavy fire as they attempted to land. Nevertheless, the incoming paratroops gained the upper hand and the Dutch were routed and surrendered “in droves”. The new arrivals were then sent to Arnhem to assist in the attempt to break through to the bridge. Later in the day, the first resupply drop arrived and although most supplies arrived, only a small amount could be collected as the area was not fully under British control. The ground troops were unable to communicate to the aircraft due to the radio faults and airdrops into unsecured areas would be a problem in the days to come.
By the morning of the 19th, the British now had sufficient men to attempt a breakthrough to Arnhem Bridge. The advance began on a narrow front, led by the 1st and 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions, plus the 2nd Battalion South Staffordshires. The attack was spotted and halted by the German defensive line. Trapped in the open and under heavy fire from three sides, the 1st Battalion disintegrated and the 3rd fell back. The 2nd Staffs were cut off and fought bravely until just 150 remained able to fight, but were overcome by midday. With no hope of breaking through, the remainder fell back westwards towards the main force at Oosterbeek where they were added to the defensive screen around the beleaguered town, referred to by the Germans as “The Cauldron” due to the intensity of the fighting there. In Britain, fog caused delays for the Polish glider troops and the whole parachute brigade failed to take off at all. This was to have serious consequences on the ground when the delayed gliders arrived.
Urquhart sent the 156th and the 10th Parachute Battalions north from Oosterbeek to capture the woods and high ground, but the Germans were by now well dug in and the Paras make could not make any progress. Urquhart ordered them back to the defences at Oosterbeek. The Paras made a fighting withdrawal, being closely pursued by Kampfgruppe Krafft. Their retreat took them across the landing grounds where the Kings Own Scottish Borderers were defending the area for the landing of the gliders borne elements of the Polish Parachute Brigade. Heavy fighting broke out as the gliders attempted to land and many were shot down or crashed on landing, causing heavy losses.
That afternoon the RAF sent 164 aircraft to drop an anticipated 300 tons of badly needed supplies to the British troops. The Germans had anticipated that resupply flights would be made and had moved five flak batteries into the area specifically to attack these flights. As the planes made their approach the flak opened up and shot down ten of the transports and damaging many others. Despite this, the brave pilots, (including Flight Lieutenant David Lord, who was posthumously awarded a Victoria Cross) continued with the mission, but the beleaguered Paras only received about 10% of the cargo, much of which was dropped in prearranged zones which the British had not been able to capture.
At the bridge, Frost’s men continued to hold, but were weakening as the Germans piled on the pressure with artillery and air attacks, made possible by bad weather grounding aircraft in England. The Germans had brought up tanks to their end of the bridge and pounded the British positions constantly until Captain Frank knocked three of them out with the last of the Piat ammunition. Just before dark the Germans sent in a Tiger tank which began pumping shells into each house in turn. Lieutenant Simpson stalked the tank, moving from house to house until he got close enough to drop a gammon bomb on it. Its crew got out and crept along the wall of the house in which he was hiding. He later recalled that, “I dropped a grenade on them and that was that. I held it for two seconds before I let it drop”.
By the 20th, the division was too weak to reach Frost on the bridge and Urquhart decided to bring all available men back to the town of Oosterbeek. Of his nine infantry battalions, only the 1st Battalion, The Border Regiment, was intact, the rest being badly mauled or scattered. He also secured the ferry crossing at Driel and hoped to hold out till XXX Corps could reach them and establish a new bridgehead over the Rhine using the ferry platforms.
That day’s supply drop fared little better than before. A message had been received in England nominating a new supply drop zone, but the Germans had intercepted it and laid out captured marker panels and set off flares to confuse the pilots, resulting in most of the supplies falling into German hands.
At the bridge, Frost finally made contact with his divisional commander and learned that his reinforcement was now unlikely. One can only wonder at the effect of this news on the men, under constant bombardment, hiding in the cellars, short of food, and facing death at any moment. Frost was then wounded by a mortar bomb and command was passed to Major Gough, who contacted his divisional commander to report his situation. He could not use the radios, but made contact through the Arnhem telephone system which was held and operated by Dutch partisans. To ensure that he could not be identified by any German listening, he referred to himself as, “the man who goes in for funny weapons”. The dwindling number of defenders crouched in the various ruins, calling out the Para’s old North African battle cry “Whoa Muhammed” to each other to check who was still alive. By late afternoon the position was becoming untenable and fire was sweeping through many of the buildings where the wounded were being treated. A two hour truce was arranged and the wounded, (including Frost) were taken into captivity.
By Thursday morning, all resistance at the bridge had ceased. In the final hours of the struggle, a radio message was sent from the bridge, “Out of ammunition, God save the King”.
The Germans rounded up the few remaining Paras hiding in the ruins and took them off to captivity. The Brits, defiant to the last, sang “Roll out the Barrel” as they marched through the rubble to an uncertain future. One of the captives, Lance Sergeant Norman Smith, later recalled that, “The Germans were not very impressed”.
It took several hours for the Germans to clear the bridge and send tanks to attempt the recapture of the bridge occupied by the Americans fighting at Nijmegen, but they were too late. The brave stand at Arnhem had given the allies crucial time to overcome the defenders before they could be reinforced.
The fighting continued in Oosterbeek and the surrounding areas until the 25th of September. The Arnhem operation cost the allies 1,984 killed and 6,584 captured against German losses of some 1,300 killed and 2,000 wounded. The entire Market Garden operation resulted in over 17,000 allied casualties and the loss of 88 tanks and 144 aircraft. German casualties are estimated at about 17,000, plus losses of 30 tanks and 159 aircraft.
Despite the bravery of the attackers, the operation failed and it would be another four months before the allies crossed the Rhine and reached the Ruhr.
The final word must go to Lieutenant General Frederick “Boy” Browning, who said of the operation, “Well, I always felt we tried to go a bridge too far”.
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