Roman Imperialism and the Dogs of War: The Origins of the Ancient Conflict With Carthage
Hamilcar led an expeditionary force to Spain, to secure the resources that Carthage would need to pay the indemnity owed to Rome. He was successful in his endeavors, expanding Carthaginian control in Iberia until his death in an ambush in 228, where he sacrificed himself to save the lives of his sons. His successor was his son-in-law, Hasdrubal the Handsome, who continued Carthaginian expansion, mostly by diplomatic means, until he was assassinated in 221. It was during his rule that the Romans, concerned with the success of the Carthaginians, sent a delegation to establish the Ebro Treaty (signed in 226 or 225). By it, the Carthaginians agreed to accept the boundary of the river Iber (Ebro), which they were not to cross in arms. Interestingly enough, the Roman historians do not inform us about Rome’s responsibilities under the treaty, although obviously there must have been some quid pro quo: Rome was not to interfere south of the Ebro.
The Romans implicitly violated the Ebro treaty by forming an alliance with the city of Saguntum, south of the Ebro and thus within Carthaginian territory. There is no evidence that such alliance existed prior to the signing of the treaty. Not only that, but Rome encouraged the Saguntines to massacre Carthaginian partisans in their city and to aggress against the Turboleti, a tribe under Carthaginian protection. Hannibal, who had been voted by acclamation the new commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian forces in Spain upon the death of his brother-in-law, reacted by marching against Saguntum and taking it by storm, after an eight-month-long siege. During those eight months the Saguntines sent repeated requests for assistance to Rome, to no avail—no help materialized. The Romans waited until Saguntum had fallen and then sent a delegation to Carthage to demand that Hannibal be turned over to them for punishment. Following the refusal of the Carthaginian assembly, Rome declared war on Carthage.
The Romans were confident of victory. Since they now controlled the Mediterranean (which they called Mare Nostrum, “Our Sea”), they were not concerned with an attack on Italy from the sea, and since the supposedly impassable natural barrier of the Alps in the north protected them from an invasion by land, they expected to wage the new war in Spain and in North Africa, the land of their enemies. Consequently, they sent an army to the south, under consul Sempronius Longus, to cross over to Africa from Sicily, and another west, under consul Publius Cornelius Scipio (the Elder), to invade Spain. Of course, they were not counting on the military genius of Hannibal and his daring expedition crossing the Alps, forcing them to change their plans. It is clear, though, that the blame for the provocation and initiation of the second Punic War rests squarely on the shoulders of Rome.
The third Punic War (149-146) was waged against a Carthage that no longer posed any threat to Rome, 34 years after the death of Hannibal. It was motivated by the hatred exemplified in the “delenda est Carthago” (“Carthage must be destroyed!”) that ended every talk of the bitter Roman senator and moralist, Cato the Elder, as well as by jealousy of the African city’s economic recovery and prosperity, following its defeat in the second war. Hannibal’s work as suffete or magistrate after the war had served to eliminate corruption in government and had allowed Carthage to offer to pay off the crippling indemnity imposed by Rome much faster than expected.
Another condition imposed on Carthage at the end of the second Punic War proved fatal—a prohibition to wage war, even in self-defense, without permission from Rome. The Romans encouraged the aggression of the Numidian king, Masinissa, who kept encroaching on Carthaginian territory. Appeals from Carthage for Rome to intervene were ignored. When finally the Carthaginians attempted to defend themselves, Rome used this as excuse to declare war. The Carthaginians did not want war, and offered capitulation plus the payment of a further indemnity. The Romans demanded that in addition they also provide hostages and surrender all weapons in the city. Once the Carthaginians had complied, the Romans revealed their true intentions. They demanded that the entire population leave the city, moving south into hostile territory where their survival would be ephemeral, and declared that Carthage would be destroyed. This, the Carthaginians refused to accept. They heroically defended their city against a Roman siege for three long years. When the Romans finally breached the city’s defenses, what followed was an orgy of killing on a monstrous scale, what we today would call ethnic cleansing, or simply genocide. The great city was razed and burned to the ground, the inhabitants—men, women, and children—were slaughtered (over 700,000), and the survivors (50,000) were sold into slavery. The libraries and all the records of the defeated were destroyed in the process, leaving only pro-Roman accounts to tell the story.
The causes of war, of any war, tend to be complex, and include social, cultural, economic, and psychological factors. The Punic Wars were no exception. Consequently, the preceding analysis cannot claim to be comprehensive or exhaustive, but in view of the available evidence there can be little doubt that the instigators of the wars between Rome and Carthage were definitely the Romans, and that their primary motivations were greed, hatred, and a thirst for conquest—in one word, imperialism. The ultimate defeat of Carthage opened the gates for the legions of Rome to march and trample on whatever freedom remained in the Mediterranean world—the predatory Roman Empire was in the process of being born.
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© 2012 by Yozan Mosig
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